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The only type of discipline provided for under the Constitution
is removal.2 So theoretically, if a judge at Supreme, High or
Circuit Court level in Ireland misbehaves, the only punishment
available is to remove him/her from office. However, various
provisions have been introduced since the beginning of the last
century in order to provide some system for disciplining
District Court judges. The first provision was introduced as
part of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924.3
The 1924 Act
The modern Irish Courts system was established by this Act,
which was necessitated following the enactment of the
Constitution of Saorstát Éireann in 1922. The Judiciary
Committee, which was chaired by Lord Glenavy, was
established in order to give recommendations on
constructing a new court system, or more specifically, the
Committee was charged with the recommendation of “a
system of judiciary and an administration of law and justice
according to the dictates of our own needs and after a pattern
of our own designing.”4 In addition to its chairman, the
committee also comprised eleven other members.5 We do not
have much information on their sources or reasons for their
recommendations, as when the Report was submitted some
four months after its appointment on the 27th January 1923,
it consisted of just 16 pages setting out the frame for the new
court structure. It was said that as the Report was
unanimous, it “[w]as not thought … necessary to set out the
reasons upon which our recommendations [were] based.”6
The Report recommended the establishment of a District
Court, Circuit Court, High Court, Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court of Appeal, to exercise both civil and criminal
jurisdiction. These Courts are the early forms of the Courts
we have today, in fact the differences are mostly
inconsequential. One of the most significant changes from
the pre-Independence model in the Act was the establishment
of the District Courts.7
Although we have an Act which is sufficient in detail, we
cannot be clear on the motivation or reasoning behind any of
the sections because of the lack of detail in the Report of the
Judiciary Committee. However, provision was made in the
1924 Act for a disciplinary procedure specifically aimed at
judges of the District Court, in section 738 which states:
“No Justice of the District Court shall be removable from
office save for incapacity or physical or mental infirmity
or misbehaviour in office or misconduct, which shall be
certified under the hands of the Attorney-General and the
Chief Justice. It shall be the duty of the Attorney-General
and the Chief Justice to give such certificate in case they
are satisfied that such incapacity or infirmity exists or that
any such misbehaviour or misconduct has taken place.
No such certificate shall be questioned or made the
subject of proceedings in any Court.”9
The first point of interest in the section is that there seems to be
a distinction made between misbehaviour in office and
misconduct whereas, in later sections they are presumed to be
analogous. The implication is that misbehaviour in office relates
specifically to conduct involving the exercise of the judicial
function. Misconduct then seems to imply something which
happens in the judge’s capacity as a private citizen. The fact that
they are aligned later on suggests they are considered equally
serious. The fact that a distinction has been made, and that both
types of misconduct are to be considered, is significant.
The second feature requiring consideration is the
imposition on the Attorney General and the Chief Justice of
the task of adjudicating on the conduct in question. We must
therefore assume that complaints are to be directed to the
office of the Attorney General or that of the Chief Justice. This
is hardly practical. The lack of a sift-out system would make
this option unfeasible. In addition, the section does not
actually specify a process of removal. Section 39 of the 1924
Act also provided that Circuit Court judges hold the same
tenure of judges of the superior courts but the same was not
applied to District Court judges until the 1946 Act therefore,
Article 68 of the Saorstát Constitution10 did not apply to judges
of the District Court. So under this procedure, the Attorney
General and the Chief Justice must first decide if
misbehaviour in office or misconduct has been committed and
if they decide it has, there is no procedure in operation to
remove the judge in question. Therefore, we can only arrive
at the conclusion that removal from office in this instance,
would have been a mere formality.11
This section however, is essentially a removal provision
rather than a disciplinary one. Later sections provide for
warnings or inquiries, whereas this section seems to be
equivalent to Article 68 but aimed at District Court judges
rather than judges of the higher courts. Rather than including
District Court judges in the constitutional provision, it was
obviously considered more convenient to have a similar but
perhaps less formal procedure for the lower ranking judges.
The 1936 Act
A body was established in 1929 to consider the workings of
the new Court system as established by the Courts Act of 1924
and make recommendations as to any changes which should
be made. It was a Joint Oireachtas Committee chaired by
Daniel Morrissey TD.12 The recommendations of the
Committee comprised mostly revision of arrangements for
remittal or transfer of actions from the Circuit Court to the
High Court and other such suggestions.13 As a result of this
report, the Courts of Justice Act was passed in 1936. The
Committee made no findings on disciplinary proceedings or
anything involving section 73 of the 1924 Act and so as such,
the provisions of that Act had not been called into question.
Nevertheless, section 73 of the 1924 Act was repealed by
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section 3 and replaced by section 49 of the Courts of Justice
Act 1936,14 which does close some of the gaps previously
identified. Section 49 states:
“(1) The Chief Justice, the President of the High Court,
and the Attorney-General shall constitute an advisory
committee for the purposes of this section, and when
acting as such committee shall have full power to
inquire into and investigate in such manner as they
think proper, whether by examination of witnesses or
otherwise, any matters referred to them under this
section or in regard to which they are authorised by this
section to take action”
It goes on to provide that the Minister for Justice or any
member of the committee may bring before the committee,
matters relating to the fitness of a judge (regarding mental or
physical health) or the conduct of a judge “whether in the
execution of his office or otherwise”.15 If the committee
decides the judge is unfit to hold office it must send a report to
the Executive Council, who may give the judge an opportunity
to resign before proceeding to remove him/her from office.
This does seem to be an improvement on the previous
section in that it does not simply reconstitute the committee but
also gives it new, specific powers of inquiry and investigation
and thus goes further to ensure a fair procedure.
This section continues the distinction between acts
committed by the judge in the execution of his office and
“otherwise” although, the words misconduct and misbehaviour
have now been replaced simply with “conduct”. Neither
section elaborated on what type of conduct outside of the
judicial function would be considered such conduct as would
merit investigation. This point obviously caused a lot of
problems however, as it was the subject of much discussion in
the Dáil. The Minister for Justice, Mr Ruttledge proposed
various amendments to the draft section:
“to delete the words ‘grave misconduct’ and substitute the
words either ‘misbehaviour in office or misconduct’, and
in line 11 to delete the word ‘misconduct’ and substitute
the words ‘misbehaviour in office or misconduct, as the
case may be.’”16
He explained his reason for this:
“The object of these amendments is to delete from
Section 5017 all references to the censuring of district
justices. We had a great deal of criticism during the
Committee Stage in regard to this matter and I have
decided to delete all references to any censure of district
justices and leave the position as suggested by the
Deputies opposite.”18
This proposal was well received in the Dáil. He then went on
to propose an additional amendment, to delete section 50 (8):
“This amendment has somewhat the same effect. It relates
to what was regarded as an objectionable proposal, to
inquire into the personal circumstances of the district
justice. I explained what was behind that, what was
suggested by some district justices as to the difficulty they
had in dealing with cases in certain areas where they had
married, and so on. Representations were made to us and,
having considered the matter, we have decided to delete
that particular provision.”19
This amendment was also accepted.
This is interesting in that the Dáil made it clear they did not
envisage a situation where the personal circumstances of a
judge could be taken into account as a result of this section.
However, the wording in the section is not unlike that of
section 73 of the 1924 Act where it states an investigation can
be carried out into the conduct of a District Court judge
“whether in the execution of his office or otherwise”. As
previously asserted, the inclusion of the words “or otherwise”
seem to imply that the conduct of a judge in his/her capacity
as a private citizen could be taken into account. But that was
what the Dáil were apparently seeking to avoid. Thus it seems
somewhat anomalous to have included such a provision in
the section.
The President of the High Court joins the Attorney General
and the Chief Justice here in order to make up an advisory
committee. The role of this committee is described in more
detail here than the role of the previous equivalent and a huge
discretion on their part is implied. If they decide misbehaviour
in office or misconduct has occurred, they must then furnish
the Executive Council with a report on the matter. The section
is also instructive in that it advises the Executive Council to
ask the judge to resign before initiating a process to remove
the wayward judge from office.
Neither this section nor section 73 of the 1924 Act specified
what should happen after the investigation or who should
remove the judge, should that be deemed necessary. As
already stated, District Court judges were not given the same
tenure as judges of the Supreme or High Court until 1946.
Therefore, the Article in both Constitutions on removal did
not apply to them. The question must then be asked: how are
they removed? Section 49 of the 1936 Act seems to give the
power to the Executive Council and we can find confirmation
of this in the Dáil and Seanad debates on the 1946 Act. The
Minister for Justice at the time, Mr Boland, in his address to
the Seanad on 11 July 1946 stated:
“In regard to the tenure of office, the position at present
is that, if there is any reason to dispense with a district
justice, there is machinery by which the Chief Justice,
the President of the High Court and the Attorney-
General deal with any complaint about the justice and,
if they think there is sufficient reason, they give a
certificate and the Government—not the Dáil or
Seanad— can remove the justice from office.”20
It is inconceivable that this point did not come up in either the
discussions of the 1924 or the 1936 Act. The District Court
judges are essentially at the mercy of the Government but this
is totally at odds with the principle of the separation of powers
which is an integral part of Bunreacht na hEireann and also was
part of the 1922 Constitution. It gives the power of removal to
the one branch of the separation of powers that should never
have it. It is crucial to the workings of our legal system and our
system of government that the executive and the judiciary not
interfere with each other. It is inevitable that the powers of the
legislature and the judiciary will sometimes overlap but this is
to be avoided where the executive is concerned.
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The 1946 Act
The 1936 Act was in turn, repealed by section 4, schedule part
1 and replaced by section 2121 of the Courts of Justice (District
Court) Act 1946,22 which states:
“Whenever the Minister requests the Chief Justice to
appoint a Judge to—
(a) Investigate the condition of health, either physical or
mental, of a Justice, or
(b) to inquire into the conduct (whether in the execution
of his office or otherwise) of a Justice, either generally or
on a particular occasion. …
(i) the Chief Justice shall appoint either a Judge of the
Supreme Court or, with the consent of the President of
the High Court, a Judge of the High Court to conduct the
investigation or inquiry;
(ii) the Judge so appointed may conduct the investigation
or inquiry in such manner as he thinks proper, whether
by examination of witnesses or otherwise, and in
particular may conduct any proceedings in camera, and
for this purpose shall have all such powers, rights and
privileges as are vested in a Judge of the High Court on
the occasion of an action;
(iii) Upon conclusion of the investigation or inquiry, the
said Judge shall report the result thereof to the Minister.”
Under this Act, as well as provision of a new system of
inquiry, District Court judges were also given the same tenure
as judges of the High Court and Supreme Court.23 A new
disciplinary procedure was also added:
“[I]n Section 20, the Minister for Justice is given power
to request the Chief Justice to appoint a judge to make
inquiry into the conduct or health of any particular
justice. That is a very good idea. At present the only
power to do that would be the power to appoint a
tribunal of inquiry. We think that in a matter of inquiry
into something about a district justice, the new
arrangement is better.”24
Deputies then questioned the Minister as to whether that was
not already possible under the 1936 Act whereby the Chief
Justice and the Attorney General could conduct an inquiry.
But he elucidated:
“No. Their power is to investigate a complaint sent to the
Minister for Justice and to report and, if they report that
the conduct of a justice was such as to merit dismissal or
that his health was such as to render him incapable, the
report will be considered by the Government, but they
have no right or power to inquire into the conduct of any
district justice and I am asking for that right in Section
20. I think it will be found very useful.”25
Certain deputies however, were worried the new section was
unduly restricting judicial independence. Deputy Cosgrave
was particularly adamant on this point, calling for the deletion
of the section because it negated independence.26 A long
debate followed this comment during which many points
were discussed including the fact that what section 19 gives,
section 20 seems to take away.27 Many deputies also
questioned the fact that judges of the District Courts should be
subject to such an inquiry where there was none for any other
rank of judge. There were also worries that once the report
about the conduct of a judge was conducted, it could be “held
over his head” and used to threaten him. Mr Boland, by way
of response, stated that District Court judges had always been
in a different position. He pointed out that the provision was
an improvement to what had previously existed in that now,
if the report should indicate misbehaviour, the judge could
only be removed by a resolution of both Houses, whereas
before, the government was empowered with this task.28 He
did not explain why one judge would be sufficient despite
calls from the opposition that two or three judges would
ensure fair procedure. He simply reiterated his claim that:
“In the other case, a certificate from that committee was
sufficient to enable the Government, without coming to
the two Houses of the Oireachtas, to dismiss him. I think
that is a very big improvement in the status and tenure
of a district justice.”29
In practical terms, District Court judges were in a better
position after this Act because of the fact that they were
removable only by a resolution of both Houses but the reasons
proffered by the Minister for Justice to explain having a special
position for District Court judges do not stand up. Just because
historically, there had been a distinction, this does not mean
that procedure cannot be modified to suit changing perceptions
in society. At one time, District Court judges may have been
looked upon as inferior to the other ranks of the judiciary but
by 1946, they had become indispensable to the system of
justice and proved themselves to be just as honourable as any
other rank of judge. Nevertheless, the division continued.
The section also persists with the use of the words “the
conduct (whether in the execution of his office or otherwise)”.
It is significant that following each repeal, this aspect was
always retained. This suggests the legislators believe what
happens in the judge’s capacity as a private citizen necessarily
affects his/her role as a judge. It is unfortunate however, that
the law-makers neglected to specify the type of conduct which
should lead to an investigation. The word “generally” seems
to intimate a situation where a judge’s overall performance
might be investigated. The words “on a particular occasion”
imply a mistake or possibly an offence.
The 1961 Act
Although the section in the 1946 Act is still law, some
additional provisions were added in the Courts (Supplemental
Provisions) Act 1961.30 This Act essentially established the
Courts system as underlined in Bunreacht na hEireann in
1937.31 It was not until the case of The State (Killian) v
Minister for Justice32 that the need to establish the new system
was highlighted. In this case, the order of a Circuit Court
judge was challenged on the grounds that his appointment to
the bench was in fact void.33 Although the Supreme Court
rejected the argument of the plaintiff, it was acknowledged
that the words of Article 34 “contemplated the future fresh
establishment of courts to replace those exercising jurisdiction
at the date of the Constitution’s enactment …”34 So it was
finally realised that legislation would have to be drawn up in
order to prevent similar claims in the future. It is incredible
that it took 24 years and a Supreme Court case for the
legislature to fulfil the constitutional requirement of a new
system of courts for the country.
The new court system which was brought in, was to all
intents and purposes, the same as the previous one. However,
the legislature took the opportunity to introduce some minor
changes. Specifically of interest to this subject is section 10(4)
of the Act which provides:
“Where the Chief Justice is of opinion that the conduct
of a justice of the District Court has been such as to
bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the
Chief Justice may interview the justice privately and
inform him of such opinion.”35
Hilary Delany has noted that:
“Section 10(4) vested a new type of supervisory
jurisdiction over the district judges in the Chief Justice. …
This was designed to deal with a type of case where the
formal inquiry provided for in section 21 of the Courts of
Justice (District Court) Act 1946 was neither necessary
nor appropriate; the Government was of the view that
this more formal procedure should only be set in train
when the allegations against the judge would, if proved,
make it necessary for the Minister for Justice to initiate
the steps necessary to remove the judge from office. It
was envisaged that this new procedure provided for in
section 10(4) would be used where a district judge had
conducted his court efficiently, yet in such a manner as
to bring the administration of justice into disrepute …”36
This section caused a lot of controversy, both in the Dáil and
the Seanad during the committee stages. The section was
introduced, it was submitted, because the power given was
traditionally implicit in the Office of the Chief Justice37 and
this section was merely giving it a statutory footing. The
Minister for Justice, Mr Haughey described it as follows:
“The bill is merely giving statutory recognition to a
practice which has in fact operated on a few occasions
in the past in accordance with which the Chief Justice,
at the request of the Minister for Justice, interviewed a
district justice privately about certain aspects of his
conduct. In every case the intervention of the Chief
Justice had beneficial results. The great advantage of
this procedure is that it enables action to be taken in a
case where a formal inquiry by a Supreme Court or High
Court judge would be unduly cumbersome.”38
However, many believed it to be an encroachment on the
independence of District Court judges: “I do not think the
power should be given. It is well known that the Chief Justice
or other judges can interview justices and I do not think it
should be included in this formal way.”39 It was also felt that
having this section as well as the subsequent one, created too
much confusion: “it seems to me we are overloading, going to
excess of caution with regard to the District Court …”40
Nevertheless, the section was passed and it was commented
that it was “in the ease of the district justice”41 to have such a
procedure before the heavy-handed mechanism of removal be
resorted to.
Even though this section is intended to be used essentially
as a warning, it is in reality, derisory. There is no onus on the
Chief Justice to conduct the interview nor are there any details
of any possible sanctions. It is unclear what action is to be
taken should the District Judge simply ignore the opinion of
the Chief Justice or refuse to attend the interview and one
would be inclined to agree with Mr Cole when he stated his
belief that it “is just a pious wish.”42 However, although there
is no obligation on the District Judge to attend, it would be in
their his/her interests to do so. The alternative would only
serve to facilitate his/her removal. Although because of the
need to protect a judge’s privacy we do not have any examples
of when this procedure was actually used, we can presume
that in practice, the procedure would be complied with.
In contrast, section 36 (2) of the same Act provides the
following:
“(2) (a) Where it appears to the President of the District
Court that the conduct of a justice of the District Court
is prejudicial to the prompt and efficient discharge of the
business of that Court, he shall investigate the matter
and may report the result of the investigation to the
Minister.
(b) In the course of an investigation under this subsection,
the President shall consult the justice concerned.”
This section is more satisfactory than the previous sections
because it is much more specific. The President of the District
Court is empowered to carry out an investigation into the
conduct of a District Court judge if it interferes in any way with
the proper running of the court. The section, unlike the others,
does not mention conduct which may occur outside of the
judicial function. However, if such conduct was prejudicial to
the efficient discharge of the business of the Court, then
perhaps it could come under the remit of the section. Although
the section is more specific in terms of the investigation, it is
still extremely vague on appropriate action to be taken
following such an investigation. It is unclear whether the
Minister must then propose a motion for the removal from
office of the judge in question or whether some suitable
punishment could be negotiated with the President of the
District Court or the Chief Justice. Nevertheless, the section
has achieved what was aimed for in that an intermediary form
of discipline is available to judges of the District Court before
recourse is had to the more serious procedures.
These sections, while not ideal, at least form the basis of a
disciplinary framework. There is recourse for those who wish
to complain about the conduct of a District Court judge, in the
interests of justice and the judge in question has the right to
be heard and the right to discussion before the more serious
penalty of removing the judge from office, is taken. At least
we can see that some attempt was made to provide some
preliminary steps for when misbehaviour occurs. Where
higher ranking judges are concerned, the only response to any
type of misbehaviour is removal.43 It is regrettable though,
that since an effort was made to provide this system for judges
of the District Court, that there was not more consideration
given to questions such as the meaning of stated
misbehaviour and mechanisms and process. What is really
lacking in all of the sections is details of sanctions to which
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recourse could be had should the behaviour be not so serious
as to require removal but nevertheless, would necessitate
punishment. Another problem with this situation is the fact
that since the Constitution does not specifically mention
District Court judges or even Circuit Court judges in regard to
security of tenure, an ordinary statute could technically,
change the removal procedure for these judges.44 There have
not been any additions or changes to these provisions in over
40 years now, perhaps a reform is due.45
Special Position?
The question must be asked as to why we have specific (but
inadequate) provisions to cover misconduct of District Court
judges but not for any other rank of judge? Was it thought that
the higher ranking judges were so honourable they would not
be capable of any misconduct? Or was it simply because at the
time, there had not been any controversy concerning higher
ranking judges? The fact that the District Court judge was the
only one not covered by the Constitutional provision until 1946
indicates that the level of respect given to this type of judge was
not quite comparable to that of the higher ranking judges. This
would seem to stem from the history of the District Court judge.
Before the 1924 Act, the District Court did not exist. It
developed from the jurisdiction of “Petty Sessions”, which was
a court of local jurisdiction presided over by a “Justice of the
Peace”. These were not traditionally judges as such, but
persons “learned in the law”.46 Delany has noted that “the
system of unpaid magistrates, or justices, did not work
satisfactorily in Ireland, for it was from time to time alleged that
unsuitable persons were being appointed to the bench.”47
Perhaps the fact that the District Court as we now know it,
emanated from this system led to a certain amount of distrust of
these courts and so it was considered necessary and acceptable
to have specific provisions relating to their misconduct, where
there were none for any other rank of judge. But that does not
justify the lack of detail elsewhere. Some have suggested it is
pure laziness in that Article 35.4.1 is exactly the same as its
equivalent in the 1922 constitution which in turn was lifted from
the Act of settlement in 1701, which gave statutory recognition
to the practice in the 1680’s under William III and Mary,
whereby judges held their positions quamdiu se bene gesserint
(according to good behaviour). That Act also fixed judge’s
salaries and provided that judges could be removed only by
address of both houses of Parliament.48
During the Parliamentary debates on the 1961 Act, certain
sections were accused of being insulting to District Court
judges in that they were following the English tradition of lack
of trust in Justices of the Peace:
“We are going to a point of suggesting to the district
justices that the Oireachtas looks upon them as an inferior
type of judge. I think we are allowing ourselves to be
influenced by some analogous procedure that obtains in
Great Britain in respect of justices of the peace.”49
However Mr. Haughey endeavored to explain the anomaly by
saying:
“The District Court is the court of the utmost importance
to our people. It is for that reason we are making these
provisions, not because we regard district justices to be
inferior in any way to anybody. In fact, our view is
exactly the opposite.”50
Whatever the reason, it seems anomalous to have such
provisions in place for one stratum of the judiciary and
nothing for the others.
Procedure in Practice
In order to have a complete discussion on this topic it will
now be necessary to consider the practical application of the
legislation. The procedure provided for under the 1946
legislation has been used twice.
(i) The Case of Judge Lennon
On the 22 January 1957, five men were charged in the Dublin
District Court with membership of an illegal organisation,
failure to account for their movements and possession of
incriminating documents. While hearing the evidence, District
Justice Lennon stated that he would have to hear something
of the evidence on the indictable charges so he could decide
if they were such as that he could treat them summarily. In
response, Mr Carrol from the Chief State Solicitors office
handed in copies of Iris Oifigiuil, bringing in part V of the
Offences against the State Act. Judge Lennon then responded
cynically: “This proclamation does not end up with the words
‘God Save the King?’”51 To which Mr Carrol replied “Am I
supposed to make any comment on that?” Judge Lennon went
on to remark: “Yes I remember proclamations of this kind in
regard to myself, and they always ended up with the phrase
‘God Save the King’. This proclamation was made in the time
of the Monarchy.” As a result of these comments, Chief
Justice Maguire was requested by the Minister for Justice, Mr
Everett, to appoint a judge to conduct an inquiry, under
section 21 of the 1946 Act, into the conduct of Judge Lennon.
Justice Teevan was appointed and after having conducting his
inquiry he concluded that the conduct of Judge Lennon was
not such as to merit his removal from office. However, the
Government disagreed and called for the resignation of the
judge on the basis that if he did not resign, he would be
removed. In response to questions by the Opposition, the new
Minister for Justice, Mr Traynor commented on the situation
as follows:
“That the judge was of opinion that Mr. Ó Leannain’s
misbehaviour was not such as to warrant his removal
from office is beside the point, since it does not rest with
the judge appointed to hold an inquiry of the kind to
decide whether or not the two Houses of the Oireachtas
should be moved to take action as the result of his report,
still less to determine, with respect to the misconduct of
a justice, whether such misconduct amounts to
misbehaviour warranting his removal from office as I am
aware the judge himself fully realises. … It was not any
function of the judge to report whether the justice’s
behaviour was such as to merit his removal or not. That
was a matter to be decided by the Government.”52
Judge Lennon opted to resign rather than go through the
removal process and so the whole affair ended quietly.53 It is
interesting though that it was the view of the Government that
it was not the place of the judge conducting the inquiry to
adjudicate on whether the misconduct amounted to
misbehaviour as to warrant removal. In the only other case of
this kind, the case of Judge O’Buachalla, the investigating
judge specifically stated his opinion that the conduct does not
amount to such misbehaviour as to merit removal and this
was apparently never questioned by the Government or any
body else. It seems sensible that the investigating judge would
come to a conclusion on the point but it is proper that the final
decision would not be left with him/her but rather to the
legislature.
The second such inquiry was established in 2000 when
Justice Francis D Murphy was appointed by the Chief Justice
under section 21 of the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act
1946, to conduct an inquiry into the conduct of Judge
Donnchadh O’Buachalla in relation to his handling of the
licensing of a premises and in relation to the discharge of his
judicial functions in cases involving two gardaí.
(ii)The Case of Judge O’Buachalla – The Facts54
Both cases centre around Catherine Nevin who, together with
her husband Thomas, owned licensed premises in Wicklow
called Jack White’s Inn. Thomas Nevin was murdered on the
19th March, 1996. A year later his wife was charged with his
murder. On the 11th April, 2000 she was convicted and she
later appealed.55 On 16th September 1996, Mrs Nevin had
reapplied, through her solicitors: Lehane and Hogan, for a
restaurant certificate, a general exemption order and a Sunday
afternoon and St. Patrick’s Day exemption order for the
premises in her own name. These were granted without any
objection from the Gardaí. Then on 15th October 1996, an
application was made for the renewal of the publicans licence.
She was informed that because of the death of one of the
license holders, she would require a certificate of transfer
from the District Court. Mrs Nevin’s solicitor, Mr Lehane
wrote a letter to the collector of Customs and Excise in May
1997 arguing that because Mr and Mrs Nevin were joint
tenants, the certificate would not be necessary as she already
had an interest in the licence since 1986. He contended that it
was merely a matter of amending the records of the Revenue.
He sent an additional copy of the letter to Mr William Sexton,
Court Clerk for District 23 and then travelled to Gorey to seek
a meeting with Judge O’Buachalla (who was an acquaintance
of Mrs Nevin) to discuss the matter.
On the 13th June 1997, Judge O’Buachalla met with
Mr Lehane to hear his argument and then consulted Mr Sexton
as to whether the certificate was necessary. Mr Sexton
determined that it was necessary. The judge decided it would
be appropriate to obtain the view of the Revenue
Commissioners. Mr Lehane proceeded to phone Mr Goodwin
in the Collector’s office and asked him whether it would be
adequate to obtain an informal authorisation from a judge to
delete Mr Nevin’s name as opposed to applying for the formal
transfer. Although the Revenue did not consent to accept such
an authorisation, Mr Goodwin agreed to consider it. It appears
Mr Lehane was now under the impression that an
authorisation would be sufficient and when he drew up a
draft document, he explained the situation to Judge
O’Buachalla who signed the document.
Various other transactions took place between June and
September 1997 and as a result of several misunderstandings,
the situation became cloudy. Judge O’Buachalla confirmed to
the Revenue that his authorisation was not an order of the
Court, whereupon the Revenue decided this authorisation was
not adequate. The renewal of the ancillary licences (granted
on 16th September 1996) then came before Judge O’Buachalla
on the 29th September 1997 but the meeting took place in his
chambers and was attended by the parties and Inspector Finn
from Gorey.56 An application was then made not to transfer
but to “regularise the licence”. The order was made and
signed by Judge O’Buachalla. The publican’s licence was
issued on the 29th September 1997 by the Customs and Exise
Office and applications for ancillary licenses were then sought
before Judge O’Buachalla. Inspector Finn was concerned as to
the legality of the order, considering the Revenue, Court
Clerks and his own Superintendent had expressed trepidation
concerning the order. The advice of Mr Thomas M Morgan,
barrister and acknowledged expert on licensing law was
sought by the State Solicitor. He expressed the opinion that
the failure to hear the applications in public was the only
mistake but that it was a minor one and a mere technicality.
This appeared to resolve the conflict.
However, there had been some media coverage of these
proceedings at the time, and on conclusion of the murder
trial, journalists sought to further explore the involvement of
Judge O’Buachalla. In response to media pressure, the judge
issued a statement on the 13th April 2000, which was both
inaccurate and incomplete. He stated that the application was
made in open court and that Inspector Finn attended all
discussions. This only served to draw more attention on the
Judge and he later accepted that the statement was
“disjointed” and explained the anomalies saying that it had
been prepared in a hurry.
(a)The Letter of Authorisation and the Hearing in Camera
In his report, Mr Justice Murphy firstly considered the
appropriateness of the letter of authorisation and decided that
Judge O’Buachalla had no power to issue the letter of
authorization but that he had been led to believe that it had
been requested by the Revenue and so the judge understood
that he was merely helping to solve a procedural problem
encountered by the Revenue. Murphy J determined that it was
an error of judgment and not an abuse of power: “In my view
he erred in acceding to that request but this was an error of
judgment and not an abuse of the legal process.”57
Then he considered the hearing in camera and decided that
it should have been held in public. Judge O’Buachalla
emphasized that there was nothing furtive about the hearing
and quoted Mr Morgan’s opinion that the failure was a minor
mistake. However, Justice Murphy stated that he would
hesitate to describe any failure to comply with the
requirements of the Constitution as minor but he was satisfied
that it was not a deliberate or conscious violation. He opined
that although the hearing should have been held in open
court, no injustice had been done. However, Justice Murphy
criticises Judge O’Buachalla as follows:
“The fact that the application was dealt with behind
closed doors could in any case, and did in the present,
give rise to a suspicion that some wrong doing was
perpetrated. Such a suspicion could be damaging to the
administration of justice and was, I am afraid, damaging
to the reputation of the Judge involved.
I am satisfied that no injustice whatever was done and
that the failure to conduct the hearing in public was due
to an error to which a number of people contributed but
for which the Judge must accept ultimate responsibility.
It is an oversight which he has every reason to regret.”58
Although Mr Justice Murphy is very polite and very cautious to
promote his view that the behaviour is not such as to warrant
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removal, nevertheless this is serious criticism of a judge who is
still hearing cases today. However, he is careful not to
undermine Judge O’Buachalla to such an extent that it would
damage his ability to conduct his duties in the future as a judge.
This shows that the fear that accountability could damage the
independence of the judiciary is always behind even minor
disciplinary measures such as this. However, although lawyers
and jurists might well be able to see through the temperate
language of Mr Justice Murphy, in the eyes of the ordinary
person this would not be considered a reprimand
(b)Bias
Finally he considered the question of bias because of previous
acquaintanceship, which in the opinion of the media, was the
core of the case. It was argued on behalf of the judge that
neither the Gardaí nor the Revenue had objected on grounds
of bias but Mr Justice Murphy decided that the absence of
objection was not sufficient justification for proceeding with
the matter and that Judge O’Buachalla was open to criticism
for failing to rescue himself from the case. However, Murphy
J concluded that Judge O’Buachalla was not actuated by bias;
his order did not deprive any person of an interest nor give
Mrs Nevin a benefit to which she would otherwise not have
been entitled. He concluded that it was not an act of
misconduct: “I believe that that failure of the Judge to
disqualify himself from hearing the application in Wexford on
the 29th September 1997 was an error of judgment and not an
act of misconduct.”59
Justice Murphy also had to consider the possibility of bias in
relation to the alleged discrimination on the part of Judge
O’Buachalla in regard to two members of An Garda Síochána
against whom Mrs Nevin had made a series of complaints. The
complaints were made between the 13th July, 1992 and 11th
February, 1993 against Garda Murphy and Garda Whelan in
relation to “corruption, perjury, sexual assault and other
related activities” but the case never proceeded as the DPP
decided against taking action. These gardaí later complained
that they were being discriminated against by Judge
O’Buachalla in that they believed he treated them with
hostility, favoured the persons whom they prosecuted and that
he had specifically discriminated against them in that they
were not permitted to take the oath in the normal manner but
instead had to repeat the words after the Court Clerk had
recited them. As a result of a separate investigation, it was
concluded that the manner in which Judge O’Buachalla dealt
with the prosecutions was in keeping with the manner in
which he and other members of the judiciary have dealt with
similar cases, that there was nothing unusual in his decisions
and that although the matter of the oath was inconsistent, he
had done nothing wrong. The gardaí subsequently withdrew
their complaints. Justice Murphy felt that because of this there
could be no allegation as to misconduct in this respect.
Justice Murphy also indemnified Judge O’Buachalla as to
his costs stating:
“The irregularities, to which significance might not have
been attached but for the friendship of the Judge with
Mrs Nevin, gave rise to suspicions of misconduct which
could not have been dispelled otherwise than by an
inquiry conducted in public. The fact that the Judge
contributed to those irregularities in the manner and to
the extent referred to above is not a ground for penalizing
him in costs.”60
This report was then submitted to the Department of Justice
and because of the findings, no further action was taken. We
have to consider whether this was a satisfactory outcome.
Although the actions of the judge in question might not have
amounted to misconduct such as would require removal from
office, he did exercise a power which he did not hold (to
conduct a hearing in private contrary to the requirements of
the Constitution) and fail to recuse himself from a case in
which he was well acquainted with one of the parties. That,
in the humble opinion of the author, is grounds for some sort
of reprimand. This case really emphasises our lack of a system
for lesser forms of punishment. It is surprising that there were
no calls for legislation following this episode, considering the
fact that the media were adamant Judge O’Buachalla should
have been reprimanded.
In terms of procedure, the inquiry was carried out in public
in the format of a court case where the parties involved gave
evidence, which was adjudicated upon. A report was drawn
up by Mr Justice Murphy which, after having been submitted
to the Department of Justice, was then published by the
Department. This procedure was deemed successful and it is
submitted that it is adequate as a first step. However, in order
to complete the procedure, if it is decided that the misconduct
is not such as to warrant removal from office, there should be
specific punishments available to the Oireachtas to impose on
the judge in question.
In conclusion, it is submitted that providing for disciplinary
provisions other than removal is essential in order to ensure
justice, both to judges and those who might wish to discipline
a judge. However, the disciplinary procedures in operation in
this country are not sufficient; they are lacking in detail and
need further consideration as to actual procedure. The
reasons for having these provisions solely for judges of the
District Court no longer stand up and so it is suggested that,
in order to ensure fairness, procedures should be put in place
for judges of all courts. Were the procedures clarified and
provision for investigation (including a public hearing with
the guarantee of fairness of procedure) and reprimand laid
down in legislation, it is submitted that the situation would be
considerably more satisfactory.
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